This chapter examines the challenges developing countries face in using their flexibilities under the TRIPS agreement with regard to patents, with a particular focus on measures to restrict the granting of patents on incremental pharmaceutical innovations. I explain the constraints that developing countries operate under and the significance of patent examination as a health-oriented policy instrument. I then look in detail at the Brazilian experience of attempting to restrict pharmaceutical patents through examination procedures. I focus on two sources of coalitional weakness that have beleaguered the Brazilian system, how divisions within the state isolate the officials responsible for executing the policy and how the changing interests of the local pharmaceutical sector dilute support from key societal actors.
combined with the ambivalent interests and preferences of key industrial actors, can weaken and undermine coalitions sustaining health-oriented patent examination.
This chapter has three sections. In the first section, I provide a brief overview of the constraints imposed by TRIPS and explain the particular challenges of patent examination in the case of pharmaceuticals. In the second section, I introduce the Brazilian case, explaining how the Prior Consent mechanism is designed to work and illustrating the high level of conflict. In doing so, I contrast my findings on the actual operations of this policy intervention with the way it has been depicted by many international observers. In the third section, I explain why Prior Consent has generated so much conflict, focusing on the isolation of state officials responsible for executing the policy and ambivalent interests of key actors in the local, Brazilian pharmaceutical industry.
TRIPS, Patent Examination, Pharmaceutical Innovation
An important characteristic of patents is that the private ownership rights are not conferred automatically upon possession of knowledge. Instead, patents are granted by the state only where (a) the knowledge falls within the range of subject matter that is eligible for patents and (b) applicants demonstrate that their inventions satisfy standard patentability criteria of being novel (i.e. new), inventive (i.e. non-obvious) and having industrial utility.
With regard to determining patentable subject matter, TRIPS reduces discretion in setting the scope of patent eligibility. Article 27 requires countries to grant patents of twenty years in all fields of technology. 4 The non-discrimination rule means that countries can no longer refuse, as a matter of policy, to issue patents to particular classes of goods. The importance of this change cannot be emphasized enough. The issue of what sorts of inventions are eligible to be patented has historically been a critical feature that differentiated national approaches toward IP. Many countries refused to grant patents to certain products, for example. In the 1800s and early 1900s many countries did not grant patents at all, and many did so only to nationals.
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The inability to deny patents on a sectoral basis is particularly significant in the realm of pharmaceuticals. Prior to the Uruguay Round, more than forty countries did not provide any patent protection for pharmaceuticals and pharmo-chemicals, while many that did so issued patents only for processes and not for products (WHO 2002, 15) . In many developing countries, the lack of patent protection drove the growth of local pharmaceutical industries, which specialized in making generic 6 versions of drugs -some patented in developed countries, some older drugs whose patents had expired. The inclusion of mandatory pharmaceutical patentability was a trophy that the transnational pharmaceutical sector, through its national governments, secured in the Uruguay Round: as of 2005 all but the least developed countries were required to grant patents on pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals.
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With regard to applying patentability criteria in the process of patent examination, countries retain latitude under TRIPS (CIPR 2002, 114-119) . Quite simply, any individual patent application can be denied on the grounds of novelty, inventiveness and utility, even if patents are available, in principle, to the technological class. After all, these three standard criteria for patentability are ambiguous terms. How novelty, inventiveness and utility are operationalized by national patent offices (and legal systems) affects what sorts of patents are granted. A country that seeks to make knowledge ownership relatively easy to obtain and grant many patents might have relaxed standards for novelty. In contrast, a country that seeks to restrict the extent to which knowledge becomes privately owned may introduce more rigorous standards, de facto or de jure, such that fewer applications pass the test. Likewise, some countries may require greater degrees of inventiveness than others.
With regard to pharmaceuticals, denying patent applications on the grounds of insufficient novelty or inventiveness may form an important element of health-oriented patent policy (Correa 2007) . To understand this better, it is important to clarify, first, what incremental 6 I use the term "generic" to refer to non-patented versions, what the World Health Organization calls "multiple source drugs." More comprehensive definitions of "generic" would also refer to trademark status (i.e. there are plenty of drugs that are off-patent but sold under a trademark and therefore not formally "generic") and bioequivalence with the patented (reference) drug (that is, in many countries alternative, non-patented versions of drugs that have not had bioequivalence demonstrated would not be called "generics" but rather "similars"). To repeat, in this paper I use the simplest definition of generic: a non-patented version of a patented drug. See Homedes and Ugalde (2005) for a discussion of defining "generics." innovations in pharmaceuticals consist of, and then, second, how patents on incremental pharmaceutical innovations can extend periods of exclusivity and thus prevent generic competition.
Incremental innovations in pharmaceuticals consist of the various changes that are made to existing molecules and drugs. These may include alternative molecular forms (e.g. polymorphs, salts, isomers), different formulations (pills, capsules, tablets, ointments, syrups, suspensions), diverse dosage regimens, and new uses. Despite the sector being depicted as a bastion of "radical innovation" (Hall and Soskice 2001) , in fact the pharmaceutical industry is built on incremental innovation. Base molecules do not become drugs without additional innovations along the way. Some molecules perform well in laboratory tests but are less effective in the human body than alternative forms of the same base molecules. And once effective and stable molecules are settled upon, pharmaceutical innovation also consists of figuring out how to deliver them safely and effectively. The reader should simply consider any medication in the cabinet, which might include as little as 10 milligrams or as much as 500 milligrams of the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API). Delivering such miniscule amounts would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, were they not combined with a range of additional inert ingredients (i.e. excipients). Yet while excipients' role may ultimately be simply to consume space and to facilitate handling (again, imagine trying to store and handle 100 milligrams of something!), they must be selected and included in the manufacturing process in such a way as to make for a deliverable and consumable medication that retains the desired effect of the API. Finally, often the same molecules affect multiple parts of the body differently; when molecules intended for one therapeutic use turn out to be more effective in ways other than intended, additional work is entailed to develop the drug for the "new uses." 8 Taking a step back, and at the risk of being overly simplistic, the pharmaceutical research, development and production chain might be said to consist of three segments: (1) discovery of the underlying biological mechanisms that cause particular ailments; (2) creation or identification of molecules to target the relevant cells (either to cause the cells to perform more of their normal functions or to cease functioning abnormally); (3) converting seemingly useful molecules into consumable and deliverable drugs. At each step along the chain, the propensity to patent increases exponentially: the basic knowledge revealing biological mechanisms is typically not patentable (that is for Nobel Prizes!), but the subsequent steps are -and each new molecular entity (NME, stage 2) typically yields countless more applications for drug patents (stage 3). Indeed, as the International Chamber of Commerce testified to the World Health Organization, "the vast majority [of pharmaceutical patents] cover innovations which build on inventions of others…" (ICC 2005, 4) . And when we examine patent landscaptes of many drugs, it is common to see one medication protected by tens and tens (in some cases upwards of a hundred) of diverse molecular forms, formulations, processes and uses (Howard 2007; Rathod 2010) .
Indeed, taking out multiple patents on different aspects of a drug in order to effectively cordon off competitors and extend periods of exclusivity is standard practice in the pharmaceutical industry. Critics refer to this pejoratively as "evergreening." Although the industry vehemently rejects use of this specific term (GSK 2007) , devising patenting strategies to extend periods of protection and protect market shares remains fundamentally important to the pharmaceutical industry (Schertenleib, n.d.) . Consider, for example, Carlos Correa's definition of "evergreening" as "a patenting strategy consisting of acquiring patents on minor, often trivial, modifications of existing pharmaceutical products or processes in order to indirectly extend the period of patent protection over previously patented compounds." Suppose we remove the adjectives "minor" and "trivial," referring simply to "a patenting strategy consisting of acquiring patents on modifications of existing pharmaceutical products or processes in order to indirectly extend the period of patent protection over previously patented compounds." The new definition is hardly different from what the pharmaceutical industry (and patent lawyers) enthusiastically refer to as "patent lifecycle management."
Beyond the semantic debates, why might granting additional patents on incremental pharmaceutical innovations be worrisome from a public-health perspective? The principal reason is that patents on incremental innovations can extend periods of exclusivity beyond the dates in which they would otherwise expire, thus postponing the entry of competition and, subsequently, the effects that generic competition ordinarily has on prices. By way of illustration, consider an imaginary pharmaceutical firm "Px" that, in 1994, applied for a How countries treat applications for patents on incremental innovations of this sort is controversial. XYZ* may be an innovation, but any country that grants this patent will be extending Px's period of market exclusivity for six years beyond 2014, which will affect prices, the government's health budget, and patients' access to medicines. From a health perspective, then, a country may have an interest in minimizing patents on incremental pharmaceutical innovations. Although simply declaring that incremental innovations are not patentable may be a violation of TRIPS, a TRIPS-compatible policy instrument is to apply patentability criteria as rigorously as possible to make it very difficult for pharmaceutical firms to obtain such patents (Basheer 2005) . 9 Despite Px having expended resources to undertake the research required to come up with XYZ*, examiners may nevertheless rule that the incremental innovation does not warrant a patent, determining that XYZ* is not novel (perhaps this form was revealed in the original patent or prior art) or that it is not inventive (perhaps on the basis of existing knowledge and scientific literature any person "skilled in the art" could have obtained the molecular form XYZ*). The more rigorously countries apply these criteria, the fewer patents on incremental pharmaceutical innovations will they end up granting, with subsequent effects on the degree of competition in the provision of particular drugs and, ultimately, prices.
Suppose that patentability criteria are not applied rigorously at the time of examination and thus more incremental innovation patents are granted. What tends to happen then is that the period between the expiration of the patent on the base molecules and the expiration of the patent on the incremental additions is witness to lawsuits as generic firms seeking to enter the 9 There are plenty of examples of patents that lack novelty or inventiveness and clearly should never have been granted in the first place. In this example, I present a more difficult case where there does appear to be an innovation (XYZ* is an improvement on XYZ) but granting the patent on the incremental innovation nevertheless will extend Px's period of market exclusivity. In that light, it is also worth noting that not all incremental innovation patents have equal blocking effects. The extent of the blocking effect of a patent on XYZ* depends on the pharmacological usefulness of XYZ. market challenge the validity of particular patents. Patentability criteria thus are essentially applied ex post in the course of litigation rather than ex ante in the course of examination.
According to Drahos (2008) , however, there are significant benefits to denying the patents pre-emptively and not relying on litigation. Most importantly, patent litigation, in addition to being risky, has the characteristics of a public good in that the challenger bears all the costs but, if successful in invalidating a patent, the benefits are available to all since invalidation places the knowledge in the public domain. Building on Drahos's argument, one could maintain that the problems of relying on ex post litigation (and thus the rationale for a system of pre-emptive denial of weak patents) are likely to be particularly acute in developing countries on account of two reasons. First, the smaller size of markets means the gains to Notwithstanding the praise that Prior Consent has received from these observers, within
Brazil the measure has proved to be the source of never-ending controversy. In fact, Prior Consent has been subject to strong -and growing -legal and political attacks for nearly a decade. In the early 2000s, for example, the Brazilian Intellectual Property Association (ABPI) challenged the constitutionality of the law. Specifically, ABPI maintained that INPI has sole authority for granting patents in Brazil, and thus the government was violating the constitution by allocating examination responsibilities to two separate bodies. ABPI also maintained ANVISA, as the health regulator, should be focused on health matters and only health matters; not patents. And because the clause requiring ANVISA's approval was placed in the section of the LPI addressing pipeline patents, 11 ABPI asserted that the legislative intent must have been for Prior Consent to only be required for pipeline patents, 12 and that ANVISA was overstepping its authority. introduced an initiative in the Congress that would restrict ANVISA's role to pipeline patent 11 Pipeline patents refer to patents on pharmaceuticals whose original priority dates precede the change to the LPI making pharmaceutical patents eligible in Brazil (and thus could not be patented when they were new) but that were still in the development stage and thus not yet on the market as of 1996. Pipeline patents are not examined, but simply revalidated, with the expiration date 20 years from the date of application in the first country where they were filed. applications, basing this call, in the bill's motivations, on precisely the same grounds as ABPI had put forward.
14 At the same time as Prior Consent was under siege in the courts and congress, it also came under attack from within the government. The INPI, arguing that it was the solely and uniquely charged with the role of examining patent applications, formally requested that the Brazilian Attorney-General (PGF) strike out the prior consent mechanism. 15 In October 2009, the PGF published a report that supported INPI's position and called for ANVISA's role to be restricted. 16 The PGF declared that, while ANVISA could continue to evaluate pharmaceutical patent applications, in doing so it must only make health-based assessments of these applications and deny its "prior consent" to applications strictly in instances that granting the patents would pose health risks. ANVISA would no longer be allowed to examine the novelty and inventiveness of claims made in pharmaceutical patent applications;
that sort of evaluation would be reserved exclusively for the INPI. ANVISA is no longer able to intervene in the examination process as it had done, or attempted to do (see below) in the past. Indeed, following the AGU's ruling and the decision of ANVISA's directorate to not resist the new arrangements, the director of the patent examination team within the health surveillance agency subsequently resigned from his position in protest.
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Not only has this novel and TRIPS-compatible policy instrument effectively been terminated, it is also worth noting that even when in operation it did not achieve the outcomes it was designed to achieve. Indeed, observers who praise the Brazilian model tend to do so on the basis of how the prior consent mechanism was supposed to operate, not on how it actually functioned in practice. INPI has been explicit in its strategy of "completely rejecting" 20 ANVISA's participation in patent examination: patent examination is for patent offices, not health officials, according to INPI; ANVISA should dedicate itself to health affairs. Thus, INPI did not just seek to eliminate ANVISA's role in patent examination, de jure, but it pending that outcome it also worked to minimize the latter's role, de facto. . One of the curiosities of the PGF's and AGU's rulings is that the new arrangements may be exceptionally difficult to put into effect since it is rarely if ever possible to assess "health risks" on the basis of the sort of information included in patent applications. 20 The quotation comes from INPI's request to the Attorney-General (PGF 2009, 1-2) . 21 When this happened, ANVISA was often able to narrow the claims of patents before granting its prior consent (Silva 2008, 63 25 Referring to the passage in RDC-45 where ANVISA explains that its analysis is based on application of the patentability criteria established in the LPI, the PGF concludes that ANVISA is acting beyond its legally mandated domain (PGF 2009, 7, paragraphs 31-32 The entryway to the system of innovation is incremental innovation.
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ANVISA's examination, in contrast, is informed by a more critical perspective on incremental innovation in pharmaceuticals. ANVISA maintains that most polymorphs and selection patents are obvious from the original molecules and therefore lack inventiveness, for example, and that second uses lack novelty. 28 ANVISA does not deny the significant amount of research that might go into discovering and developing polymorphic forms of and second uses for existing molecules, but holds that many of these can -and often should -be denied patents by applying patentability criteria rigorously.
The divergent perspectives on incremental innovations are illustrated by looking in more detail at the substantive issues in the conflict between INPI and ANVISA. Silva (2008) provides a detailed analysis of the prior consent process, examining every patent application (Silva 2008, 60) . Most interestingly, in examining these reports, Miranda Silva distinguishes according to the substantive concerns expressed by ANVISA. She examines 442 patents that ANVISA did not approve on first exam but rather sent back to INPI to transmit to the applicants for additional information, and she classifies them according to the reason given by ANVISA. From that total I have removed the purely procedural issues (e.g. 26 Note that there is also a practical motivation to a relaxed examination system, and that is simply the huge backlog of applications INPI has. 27 Congressional hearings, 3 July 2008 (transcript, 4). 28 According to ANVISA, treating second uses as inventions, which is what is needed to justify a patent, implies that something can be invented multiple times. In Congress, responding to INPI President Jorge Avila's defense of second use patents, the director of ANVISA's patent team exclaimed, "he invents a molecule and, when he thinks he has a new use, he invents it again. The day he manages to explain that to me, perhaps we'll no longer have so much disagreement on this topic" (Congressional hearings, 3 July 2008, transcript, 60). missed deadlines, improper translation, filing irregularities). Of the remaining substantive cases, issues that are directly related to incremental innovations (e.g. degree of novelty, degree of inventiveness, whether the innovation amounts to a therapeutic use) accounted for 45.6% of the concerns expressed by ANVISA (see Figure 1) . 29 Thus, at the same time that the Brazil's innovation strategy was put into a higher gear, not only did ANVISA's strict application of patentability criteria become more rigorous, but the health agency's skepticism regarding incremental innovations became a central theme of its interactions with INPI. And this skepticism, in turn, generates further opposition from INPI.
--Figure 1 --
To summarize, the preceding analysis suggests that, even prior to the formal elimination of ANVISA's role in 2011,the Prior Consent system functioned much differently than designed, and much less effectively than many observers maintain. INPI and ANVISA did not "collaborate" (Deere 2008) ; and far from "forcing" (Drahos 2008 ) coordination between health and patent offices, INPI was able to ignore ANVISA when doing so fit its purposes.
The obvious question, then, is why this celebrated, TRIPS-compatible, health-oriented patent policy was so difficult to implement and sustain in Brazil?
The Politics of Incremental Pharmaceutical Innovation in Brazil: Bureaucratic Isolation and Coalitional Erosion
In this section I explain why Prior Consent generated so much conflict and was so difficult to implement. To do so, I focus on ANVISA's inability to mobilize sufficient support for its role in patent examination, both from within the state and from key societal actors.
Bureaucratic Isolation
One source of fragility of the coalition for health-oriented patent examination was the isolation of the principal state actors responsible for executing the policy. The inconsistent and somewhat confusing reaction within the rest of government to the conflict between INPI and ANVISA is telling.
In December 2008, the government's Inter-Ministerial Group on Intellectual Property (GIPI) declared a "consensus" position against issuing patents on most incremental pharmaceutical innovations. In doing so, it was supporting ANVISA and reproaching INPI, but the "consensus" is not so much a ruling or directive as a statement of opinion. INPI ignores the GIPI, declaring that it would not alter its examination practices without a change in the LPI itself. The GIPI itself is an intra-governmental forum for discussion and not a policymaking body, so it lacks the ability to enforce its consensus. innovation. Although GIPI expresses support for ANVISA, the fact of the matter is that no one seems ready to challenge INPI, which is regarded as an important actor in Brazil's new innovation policy. 33 With everyone committed to encouraging incremental innovation as a means to enhance the Brazilian economy's international competitiveness, there is an instinctive aversion to policies and practices that appear to go against the grain. To be opposed to incremental innovation -of any sort -simply does not resonate within a Government dedicated to increasing incremental innovation.
ANVISA's isolation must also be understood in the context of the Ministry of Health itself. are not socialized into thinking about patents, it is not something in their professional toolkit;
while they may support the outcome of reducing "trivial" patents and minimizing the extensions of patent terms, they are on unfamiliar and uncomfortable ground fighting on behalf of these goals. Or, to put it differently, ANVISA's patent examination team appears to have sympathizers within the Government, but not necessarily advocates.
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Not only did the Executive not intervene on behalf of ANVISA directly, it also failed to faciliate congressional efforts to do so. In addition to the bill mentioned above that would restrict ANVISA's role in patent examination, another proposal would formally restrict INPI by declaring second use and polymorphs unpatentable subject matter in Brazil. While the 33 INPI had countless directors in the years after the LPI came into effect in 1997, but in 2006, Jorge Avila, a civil engineer with a doctorate in health and pharmaceutical development, became President. Avila's directorship has coincided with a government decision to invest in the growth and modernization of INPI as a dimension of the emerging innovation strategy, though these changes preceded Avila's assumption of the Presidency . 34 As of 2008, COOPI was still is not integrated into ANVISA's data information system. 35 In 2007, INPI was conferred status as "international search authority" in WIPO's Patent Cooperation Treaty. 36 The most outspoken -and, at times, sole -supporter of Prior Consent in the Brazilian Government is the National Aids Program. former bill is blocked by opposition from legislators from the ruling Workers' Party (PT), the latter was written and sponsored by PT deputies and received easier treatment in relevant PTdominated commissions. Yet the PT legislators themselves await signals of approval from the Executive, signals which have not been forthcoming. While the GIPI expressed disapproval of patents on polymorphs and second uses and, presumably, would like to see INPI alter its examination guidelines to adopt a more restrictive stance, the Executive does appear to support an outright, statutory ban on such patents.
Coalitional Erosion
Outside of government, ANVISA received the most solid and active support from health- increased by 344% in pharmo-chemicals and 226% in pharmaceuticals. The levels are low, but the growth is unmistakable, and it is growth that underpins actor's changing policy preferences.
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-- Table 1 39 One actor of local industry that has most consistently supported prior consent is the association of generics producers. These firms are hurt most directly by "evergreening", and their own business strategies are less based on incremental innovations. That said, the divisions are not clear and changes are afoot in this sector as well, as the "generic" firms in this sector are increasingly fused with transnational and Brazilian firms that retain strong interests in patenting incremental innovations. 40 Hasenclever and Paranhos (2009) and Ryan (2010) provide additional data of these changes. 41 The principal three-digit IPC categories are C07 (organic fine chemicals) and A61 (pharmaceuticals). The WIPO concordance is based on classifications at four digits (e.g. C07D, A61K), but the Brazilian data is only available at three digits. This data limitation prevents me from providing distinct data on biotechnology (since biotechnology and pharmo-chemicals share some of the three-digit categories). 42 Use of these indicators overstates the extent of radical innovations, since some of the pharmo-chemical patents are, upon closer examination, incremental. To minimize this error, the WIPO concordance does not include pharmo-chemical patents that have a secondary listing as pharmaceuticals, a step I am unable to take data: while there is little change as regards pharmo-chemical applications, the growth in pharmaceutical applications is unmistakable. While radical pharmaceutical innovation remains largely out of the reach of Brazilian firms and scientists, local actors are acquiring increased capabilities to innovate incrementally. Indeed, the data suggest that local firms do not just harbor aspirations for incremental innovations, but many of them already possess such capabilities. The question is if actors want, as a matter of policy, for the bias to be in favor or against the granting of patents on incremental innovations in pharmaceuticals. A bias in favor will disadvantage local firms relative to foreign firms, for notwithstanding Brazilian actors' increased capabilities for incremental innovation suggested in Figure 2 , they are still far behind the leading, transnational firms in this regard. Yet a systematic bias against granting patents on incremental pharmaceutical innovations will disadvantage local firms in an abolute sense, since incremental innovations are just about the only innovations most can expect to achieve. The empirical question is which set of risks and opportunities mobilize local with the Brazilian data. Note that the bias goes in just one direction, for the pharmaceutical patents are almost entirely incremental.
43 One way of interpreting the different rates of growth in the pharmaceutical vs. pharmo-chemical applications is that the amount of capability and skill development required to move from imitating to innovating incrementally is less than what is required to move from innovating incrementally to innovating radically. Brazilian industry has made the first transition, but remains far from being able to accomplish radical innovations on a systematic basis. 45 Cassier and Correa (2007) also point to the opposition of local pharmaceutical firms and scientific researchers to legislative initiatives that limit opportunities for pharmaceutical patenting. 46 The problem, of course, is that this middle road, as sensible as it sounds, is difficult to realize. Both INPI and ANVISA claim that this is what they do, but the significant amount of substantive conflict over patent applications suggests they must not both be doing this. Indeed, the problem is in determining which applications are deserving vs. non-deserving, and, again, this is a political choice, not simply a technical evaluation.
47 I learned about this statement and the events related to its "adoption" in personal communication with a member of ABIFINA. The former director of COOPI evidently was not aware of the association's "support." See the interview with Luis Carlos Wanderley Lima in Intellectual Property Watch, cited above in note 19.
In fact, the conflict itself radicalized ANVISA and pushed local industry more into INPI's camp. After all, from industry's perspective, an outright prohibition on some types of incremental innovations (e.g. polymorphs and second uses) is more alarming than rigorous scrutiny of each application, as the former essentially equates incremental innovation with triviality. When legislators proposed this outright ban, ANVISA's original response was lukewarm, arguing that it was not necessary to change the law but rather enforce the existing law to assure that ANVISA could perform its functions. Yet with INPI "boycotting" the system and GIPI unable to back-up its "consensus," ANVISA since came to support the more radical (and, from industry's perspective, draconian) legislation.
Finally, it is worth contrasting the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry's contrasting dispositions vis-à-vis Prior Consent and the governments' policy on compulsory licenses. The latter policy threatens minimal losses, as the compulsory licenses (threatened and, in one instance, issued) have targeted essential medicines that are patented by non-Brazilian firms.
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Compulsory licenses also promise potential benefits in terms of possibilities of becoming suppliers of pharmo-chemical inputs to the Brazilian state-owned labs that will make the medicines. 49 In contrast, a restrictive policy on patenting incremental innovations threatens significant losses.
Conclusion
Since the introduction of TRIPS, tens of thousands of pages of books and articles have been dedicated to discussions of "policy space" and the rights and abilities of countries to tailor their patent systems to suit national needs and objectives. The case study of the politics of pharmaceutical patent examination in Brazil illustrates the political challenges to implementing health-oriented, TRIPS-compatible patent policies. In particular, I have drawn attention to two conditions that make the social and political coalition for health-focused patent examination extremely fragile: the isolation within the state apparatus of those officials responsible for executing the policy, and the ambivalent interests and political motivations of potentially key constituencies in the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry. Given that one of the explanatory factors in the Brazilian case is the isolation of the officials responsible for executing the policy, it might be that a different institutional design would allow Brazil to achieve a different outcome. Related to this, Reichman (this volume) makes a strong call for more inter-ministerial coordination to help integrate the activities of diverse government branches with an interest in IP policy (health, justice, competition, development, trade and so on). Yet Brazil has an inter-ministerial group that is designed to do precisely this. Likewise, it has been suggested, that one way to overcome the inter-agency conflict between ANVISA and INPI would simply be to move ANVISA's patent examiners into INPI. After all, in India, the policy to minimize patents on incremental pharmaceutical innovations does not depend on dual examination but rather requires that the patent office itself engage in rigorous application of India's stringent patentability criteria. In the simplest terms, examiners in India's equivalent to INPI treat patent applications similarly to the way ANVISA's examiners do. As simple as it sounds, advocating this for Brazil would seem to be confusing cause and effect, for if ANVISA's examiners were operating within INPI, they almost certainly would not be allowed to examine patents as rigorously as they did from 2001-2011 when Prior Consent was in effect.. Indeed, ANVISA's examiners could only get away with strict and rigorous examination of patents because they were isolated. There is something that permits rigorous patent examination and makes a systematic bias against patents on incremental innovations so much more durable in one country than another, but that something is not institutional design.
The broader implications of this analysis for knowledge governance are not comforting.
Brazil is a leader in protecting developing countries' rights and prerogatives to tailor national patent regimes to national needs. Source: Author's elaboration, based on data in Miranda Silva (2008, 63-67) .
